

Gaza Phase II: Roadblocks to Progress and Empowering the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza

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Report

ARAVA INSTITUTE

מכון הערבה

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We would like to thank our friends at the Civil Military Coordination Centre, and Damour for Community Development for their support and vision for a better future for our region.

About the Arava Institute

The Arava Institute is a regional hub for education, cross-border research, and applied environmental diplomacy – a place where Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, and international changemakers come together to confront the intertwined challenges of climate change and regional conflict.

For more than 30 years, our academic programs and applied research have advanced tangible environmental solutions for communities across the region, amid shifting political realities and repeated cycles of violence – cultivating and deepening trust, strengthening partnerships, and building together a more just and sustainable future.

Applied Environmental Diplomacy

Applied Environmental Diplomacy uses environmental cooperation as a tool for conflict resolution, while addressing intertwined ecological challenges. As climate change intensifies instability in our region, this approach responds to a growing need for new forms of diplomacy – creating a feedback loop in which environmental action can help ease conflict conditions, and diplomatic tools can support solutions to environmental crises. Together with our partners, we put this into practice through scalable environmental initiatives in Gaza, the West Bank, the Negev, Jordan, and beyond.

Glossary

BoP – Board of Peace

CMCC – Civil Military Coordination Centre

COGAT – Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories

IDF – Israeli Defence Forces

ISF – International Stabilization Force

JHG – Jumpstarting Hope in Gaza

NCAG – National Committee for the Administration of Gaza

INGO – International Non-Governmental Organization

PA – Palestinian Authority

UN – United Nations

UNOPS – United Nations Office for Project Services

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

USAF – United States Armed Forces

WASH – Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

Phase II of the Trump 20-Point Peace Plan and the Environment

The environment is not part of the Trump 20-Point Peace Plan, although item 7 mentions the rehabilitation of water, electricity, and sewage infrastructure, as well as removing the rubble in Gaza. While the humanitarian crisis created by the war is immense, we cannot ignore the environmental damage caused, and its exacerbation due to the current stalemate on the geopolitical front. The extensive bombing and rocket fire has released tons of greenhouse gasses, small particle pollutants, and dangerous chemicals into the atmosphere. Sixty to seventy million tons of rubble containing asbestos, dangerous chemicals, unexploded ordinance, and even human remains cover Gaza's destroyed neighbourhoods and roads. Mountains of solid waste pile up next to displaced persons shelters while raw sewage runs through the shelters, absorbed into the aquifers and flowing into the Mediterranean Sea. Rodent and insect infestation plague the makeshift communities as they struggle to avoid a public health crisis that is already impacting the morbidity and mortality rates of the people of Gaza.



Figure 1: Ruins of buildings located in Jabalya, January 21, 2025.
Photo by Dawoud Abu Alkas/ Reuters

The environment knows no borders, and air pollution, water degradation, and spread of disease are not limited to the Gaza Strip. The environmental impact will be felt in Israel, Egypt, and the wider region. The impact of war in general, on climate change, is of course a global phenomenon but not widely recognized. Attempting to address the long-term impact of the war on climate change, and the direct impact of the war on the local environment is impossible without a geopolitical process. If there is no security for Palestinians or Israelis, if there is no agency for Palestinians in Gaza, the environmental issues and the shared natural resource challenges which require long-term cross-border cooperation will never be addressed.

It is in this light, that the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies has decided to focus on **Gaza Phase II** of the Trump 20-Point Peace Plan because we believe that its implementation is the key to rebuilding a more sustainable and peaceful Middle East.

Our proposal for the environmental reconstruction of Gaza, published in September 2025, can be read [here](#).

Executive Summary and Recommendations

This report provides an update on the current situation in the Gaza Strip and insight into the organizations and governing bodies which are working towards rebuilding it. We have provided a comprehensive overview of the status of **Gaza Phase II** and the roadblocks facing humanitarian aid distribution, as well as an upholding of the ceasefire and deployment of the International Stabilization Force (ISF). This report concludes with a series of suggestions as to how best address the delayed progress of **Gaza Phase II** through mechanisms which build the legitimacy of the newly appointed technocratic government, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG).

This paper discusses how the NCAG can operate in ways that allow it to remain politically relevant during the interim period imposed by the ongoing deadlock between Israel and Hamas, and how it can position itself as a credible and influential political actor, both regionally and internationally, despite it being perceived as an externally driven United States initiative

This report argues that one of the central challenges facing Gaza Phase II is not humanitarian or military, but fundamentally political. The absence of a clearly sequenced implementation strategy for demilitarization and governance transition has produced a stalemate in which no major actor is willing to move first. Israel remains unwilling to permit large-scale reconstruction or governance transfer while Hamas remains armed. Hamas refuses to demilitarize while Israeli military operations and territorial occupation continue. International stakeholders remain hesitant to fully deploy resources, clear security guarantees, and governance mechanisms. As a result, the NCAG has been unable to emerge as a credible governing alternative capable of filling the political vacuum inside Gaza. The continuation of this stalemate leaves NCAG vulnerable to discreditation in the eyes of Gazans, thus risking the eventual disbandment of the Committee by its international supporters.

To address this series of roadblocks, this report proposes a three-pronged strategy focused on strengthening the NCAG's political legitimacy, operational relevance, and institutional preparedness.

The three core recommendations are as follows:

1. First, the NCAG must be granted immediate practical responsibilities in humanitarian coordination, aid distribution, border administration, and reconstruction oversight, even before full deployment into Gaza.
2. Second, international actors must begin proactively constructing the physical, legal, and administrative infrastructure required for governance prior to the NCAG's entry into Gaza, ensuring the rapid and effective transition from military stabilization to civilian administration once conditions permit.
3. Third, the NCAG must adopt a comprehensive multilingual communications strategy targeting Gazans, Israelis, regional actors, and international stakeholders to establish itself as a visible and credible governing institution.

Ultimately, the report concludes that the success of Gaza Phase II depends on whether the NCAG can evolve from a symbolic diplomatic initiative into a functioning governing authority capable of earning legitimacy among Gazans while maintaining support from regional and international stakeholders. The report therefore also recommends steps to bolster the legitimacy of the Trump 20 Point Peace Plan by prioritizing the safety and security of the civilian population and separating the civilian population from the militant influence. Without such a transition, the current stalemate risks prolonging humanitarian suffering, undermining reconstruction efforts, and creating the conditions for renewed instability and conflict in Gaza, Israel, and the region.

One final suggestion of the report is to consider using green shelters (App. F) established by Jumpstarting Hope in Gaza (Damour and the Arava Institute) and other NGOs as testing ground for a different reality, one in which civilians are safe, not threatened by the IDF or by Hamas, one in which security is guaranteed by the ISF, and governance is provided by NCAG. If this idea takes hold, it could spread throughout Gaza and hasten the much-needed transition.

Introduction

Following the October 10, 2025, ceasefire between Israel and Gaza, Gaza has remained in a state of humanitarian crisis. The ceasefire was conditional on several factors, the first phase of the ceasefire being the return of the remaining 20 living and 28 deceased hostages to Israel. In exchange for the hostages, Israel released 250 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences, 1700 Gazans who had been detained following October 7, and the remains of 15 Palestinians for each deceased hostage¹.

On November 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2803 which formally recognized the establishment of the Board of Peace (BoP), and called upon the BoP to establish the International Stabilization Force (ISF). Resolution 2803 also outlined the general terms of the ceasefire and Hamas' demilitarization, and US President Donald Trump's 20-Point Peace Plan².

Since the ceasefire, progress to rebuild Gaza has been heavily delayed due to both bureaucratic processes which are heavily limiting the ability of building materials to enter the Gaza Strip, as well as the war between the United States, Israel, and Iran which began on February 28, 2026. Neither Hamas nor Israel have upheld the ceasefire in Gaza. Israel continues to regularly use military force in Gaza, and Hamas refuses to disarm themselves, both of which are preventing the demilitarization of the Strip.

Israel currently occupies approximately 60% of the Gaza Strip, known as the "green zone".³ The remaining 40% along the Mediterranean coast, called the "red zone", is controlled by Hamas. Initially, the IDF was set to control 53% of Gaza within these borders, however, this percentage has increased due to the creation of an additional buffer zone between their controlled

¹ Alexander Cornwell and Maayan Lubell, "Details of the Gaza Ceasefire Agreement," Reuters, October 10, 2025, [Reuters](#)

² United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2803 (2025), S/RES/2803 (2025), November 17, 2025, United Nations Digital Library

³ Dov Lieber and Anat Peled, "Israel Is Exerting Control Over a Bigger Slice of Gaza," Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2026, <https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-is-exerting-control-over-a-bigger-slice-of-gaza-f6b833dc>

territory and the territory controlled by Hamas known as the “orange line”⁴.

Roughly 2.2 million Gazans currently live in Gaza, the vast majority in the red zone.⁵ This area is coastal, formerly urban and agricultural, and now densely populated with internally displaced persons shelters.

80% of the buildings in Gaza have been reduced to rubble, leaving a lack of infrastructure in the red zone for power, water, or sanitation. There is not enough land available for agriculture due to the majority of Gaza’s agricultural land currently being controlled by the IDF⁶, or occupied by displaced persons shelters. UN assessments suggest that development in Gaza has receded by 77 years over the course of the war, and will require \$71.4 billion USD and at least a decade to recover.⁷

The Gaza Strip has five geographic areas: Rafah, Khan Yunis, Middle Area, Gaza, and North Gaza. It is likely that Gaza’s rebuilding efforts will begin in the Rafah region in the south and then slowly move forward as each block is de-militarized, as discussed in the inaugural BoP meeting.⁸



Figure 2: Map of Gaza - Orange Line

This map produced by the Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem, shows the difference between the initial yellow line distinction, and the creation of an additional buffer between IDF activities and Hamas. This new buffer is known as the “orange line.”

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- ⁴ Pesha Magid, Nidal al-Mughrabi, and Alexander Cornwell, “Israeli Maps Outline Expanded Zone of Military Control in Gaza,” Reuters, April 29, 2026, <https://www.reuters.com/world/israeli-maps-outline-expanded-zone-military-control-gaza-2026-04-29/>
- ⁵ Gisha, “Between the Yellow and Orange Lines,” Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, accessed May 26, 2026, <https://gisha.org/between-the-yellow-and-orange-lines-heb/>
- ⁶ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Gaza Debris Management Situation Report – December 2025,” December 19, 2025, <https://www.undp.org/papp/publications/gaza-debris-management-situation-report-december-2025/>
- ⁷ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Humanitarian Situation Report | 23 April 2026,” UNISPAL, April 24, 2026, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ocha-humanitarian-situation-report-23-april-2026/>
- ⁸ Board of Peace, “Board of Peace Convenes Inaugural Meeting,” February 19, 2026, <https://boardofpeace.org/blog/inaugural-meeting>

Timeline of events

Date	Event	Comments
September 29, 2025	20-Point Peace Plan unveiled	The 20-Point Peace Plan is the foundational plan by the United States government for the demilitarization and rebuilding of Gaza.
October 10, 2025	Ceasefire announced	The October 10, 2025, ceasefire between Israel and Hamas marks the most stable and longest lasting ceasefire since October 7, 2023. While the ceasefire has not been entirely upheld, as the Gaza Strip is still highly militarized, full-fledged war has not resumed since it was established.
October 13, 2025	Gaza Peace Summit (Sharm El-Sheikh)	The Gaza Peace Summit was co-chaired by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and United States President Donald Trump. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was not present at the Summit.⁹
November 17, 2025	UNSC adopts Resolution 2083 to form the Board of Peace	UNSC Resolution 2083 is the legally binding decision which recognizes the authority of the BoP, the CMCC, ISF, and the NCAG as the bodies handling the governance and rebuilding of Gaza. It includes the 20-Point Peace Plan and general instructions for the immediate next steps regarding Gaza.¹⁰ It passed with 13 votes in favour, no votes against, and two abstentions from Russia and China respectively.
December 3, 2025	20-Point Peace Plan approved by the Knesset	The 20-Point Peace Plan was adopted by the Israeli Knesset after it was raised as a motion by the opposition. While there were no votes against it, Prime Minister Netanyahu was not present at the time of the vote, nor were any of his government coalition members. ¹¹

⁹ Egypt State Information Service, “Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit,” accessed May 25, 2026, <https://sis.gov.eg/en/media-center/events/sharm-el-sheikh-peace-summit/>

¹⁰ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2803 (2025)

¹¹ Keshet Neev, “Article 879051,” Jerusalem Post, accessed May 26, 2026, <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-879051>



January 14, 2026	The United States announces that Gaza is entering the second stage of the truce plan	The announcement by the United States that Gaza is entering into the next stage of recovery, on January 14, 2026, marked a hopeful turning point for Gazans. However, very limited progress has been made since this announcement. ¹²
January 15, 2026	National Committee for the Administration of Gaza holds its inaugural meeting	The NCAG's inaugural meeting took place in Cairo, Egypt. The meeting covered several important elements about the future of Gaza, with the core focuses being assessing the current conditions in Gaza, coordination with partners already operating within Gaza, developing plans to deliver more services within Gaza, and discussion of a communication strategy. ¹³
February 19, 2026	Board of Peace has its first meeting	The BoP's first meeting was held at the Trump Institute of Peace, in Washington, DC. The topics discussed at this meeting included humanitarian progress, the importance of phased redevelopment, funding and security for Gaza, a dedicated reconstruction fund, and possible directions forward. ¹⁴ The meeting was attended by representatives of 27 member states, and another 23 representatives from observer states. ¹⁵

¹² “Statement on President Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict.”

¹³ National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, “First Meeting,” National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, accessed May 26, 2026, <https://www.ncag.ps/en/news/first-meeting/>

¹⁴ “Board of Peace Convenes Inaugural Meeting,” February 19, 2026.

¹⁵ Ibid.



Status of the stakeholders

There are several stakeholders critical to the facilitation of **Gaza Phase II**. These stakeholders range from humanitarian aid to governance facilitators.

Stakeholders include:

CMCC – The Civil Military Coordination Centre (CMCC) is the main headquarters handling the aid and future development of Gaza. The CMCC is run by the United States Armed Forces, and supported by the Israeli Defence Forces.¹⁶ In addition to the US and Israeli military presence, it includes delegates from Egypt, Italy, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other military forces.¹⁷ They are also joined by organizational partners such as the United Nations and humanitarian aid groups who have a strong presence at the facility.

CMCC offices are located across three floors in its facility in Kiryat Gat, Israel. One floor is accessible only to the USAF, one is only accessible to the IDF, and the middle floor is for international partners to collaborate with the IDF and the USAF. The CMCC has no Palestinians present at the facility in Kiryat Gat, nor do they have an active local presence in the Gaza Strip.




Figure 3: 20-Point Trump Plan Poster photographed by David Lehrer at the CMCC in Kiryat Gat
March 2026

- ¹⁶ Israel Prime Minister's Office, "PM Netanyahu Visits CMCC in Kiryat Gat," Gov.il, October 29, 2025, <https://www.gov.il/en/pages/pm-netanyahu-visits-cmcc-in-kiryat-gat-29-oct-2025>
- ¹⁷ U.S. Central Command, "CMCC Grows with Representatives from 50 Nations and International Organizations," U.S. Central Command, November 28, 2025, <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4344137/cmcc-grows-with-representatives-from-50-nations-and-international-organizations/>



The CMCC operates four working groups: Information, Humanitarian Assistance, Engineering and Infrastructure, and Support to Civil Governance. Each of these working groups is composed of expert members from the USAF, IDF, other military partners in the CMCC, international agencies such as UN agencies, and international aid organizations as well as local Israeli NGOs.

The central mission of the CMCC is to implement the 20-Point Peace Plan, as emphasized by the large copies of the document displayed throughout the facility. One of the most significant shortcomings of the 20-Point Peace Plan is the lack of a designated order or timeline to implement the points in the plan. Therefore, a main contributor to the current deadlock facing recovery progress in Gaza is the competing political priorities for who takes the first step towards demilitarization.

Board of Peace (BoP) (chaired by the United States of America and President Donald Trump) – The member states of the Board of Peace are Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

The BoP is responsible for monitoring the CMCC and setting the political agenda for its actions. The BoP's first meeting on February 18, 2026, focused on enhancing humanitarian aid efforts, working towards initial reconstruction efforts, and establishing a path forward for Gaza, with consideration to funding capacity and security infrastructure.¹⁸



Figure 4: Board of Peace inaugural meeting, Washington DC, February 19, 2026.

Photo: White House

¹⁸ Board of Peace, “Board of Peace Convenes Inaugural Meeting”

In addition to representatives from its member states, the BoP includes two executive committees dedicated to its general oversight, and Gaza specifically, composed of American business professionals, politicians, and foreign ministers from Middle Eastern countries, or with roles at the UN that focus on the Middle East.

Executive Board for the Board of Peace and Executive Board for Gaza – The Executive Board for the Board of Peace is composed of 9 members; there are also two Senior Advisors who oversee the Board.¹⁹ (App. A) US President Donald Trump chairs the Board. Each member of the Board oversees a different portfolio relating to international development and governance.²⁰

The Gaza Executive Board of the Board of Peace has 14 members, some of whom overlap with the Executive Board for the Board of Peace.²¹ (App. B)

International Stabilization Force – The International Stabilization force functions within the CMCC but is a separate entity. The ISF area in the CMCC requires a code for entry and is a highly restricted area. The founding member states of the ISF are Indonesia, Morocco, Albania, Kosovo, and Kazakhstan.²² Its mandate is outlined in UNSC Resolution 2803, which states that the ISF’s role is to work in coordination with Israel and Egypt to deploy security forces into Gaza.²³ These forces will work to create stability in Gaza through demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, protecting Gazan civilians from currently present armed groups, and to create a pathway for the NGAC to enter Gaza, and gain the authority to govern.

¹⁹ Board of Peace, “Members,” accessed May 25, 2026, <https://boardofpeace.org/members/>

²⁰ The White House, “Statement on President Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict,” January 16, 2026, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/01/statement-on-president-trumps-comprehensive-plan-to-end-the-gaza-conflict/>

²¹ “Gaza Executive Board,” Board of Peace, accessed May 26, 2026, <https://boardofpeace.org/gaza-executive-board>

²² Board of Peace, “Gaza Pledges,” Board of Peace, accessed May 26, 2026, <https://boardofpeace.org/gaza-pledges>

²³ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2803 (2025)

The member states were strategically chosen for the establishment of the ISF as majority Muslim states, in the hope that this would both aid in their acceptance by the local population, and their cultural understanding of how to proceed with the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip.

The progress of the ISF has been stalled by the war between the United States, Israel, and Iran which began in February 2026. The plan for ISF's formal entry into Gaza has yet to be publicly announced.

National Committee for the Administration of Gaza – The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) is the newly appointed technocratic government of Gaza. It is composed of 12 appointed commissioners who cover energy and transport, agriculture, communications and digital services, social protection, economy, industry and trade, education, finance, health, interior and internal security, justice, land and housing, and municipal affairs and water.²⁴ (App. C) It positions itself as a temporary governing body that will maintain authority over Gaza until the Palestinian Authority (PA) has the capacity to govern Gaza; the NCAG itself has no political affiliation.²⁵

The NCAG receives its funding through the BoP. Several countries have contributed funds to help build and sustain the NCAG, so far \$17 billion USD.²⁶ The most significant pledges to rebuild Gaza have come from the Gulf states (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia), who have all pledged at least \$1 billion USD.²⁷ However, the only countries which have followed through with sending funds to the BoP are Morocco and the UAE. The UAE has also pledged an additional \$100 million USD which will be

²⁴ National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, “Members,” National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, accessed May 26, 2026, <https://www.ncag.ps/en/members>

²⁵ National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, “NCAG Statement: May 5,” National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, accessed May 26, 2026, <https://www.ncag.ps/en/news/ncag-statement-may5/>

²⁶ Board of Peace Has Received Only Tiny Fraction of \$17 Billion Pledged for Gaza, Sources Say,” The Times of Israel, accessed May 26, 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/board-of-peace-has-received-only-tiny-fraction-of-17-billion-pledged-for-gaza-sources/

²⁷ Ibid.

specifically dedicated to training Gaza's new police force.²⁸ The UAE is the largest contributor of humanitarian aid to Gaza and is likely using this investment to signal itself as a dominant regional leader.

The NCAG is currently based in Cairo, with limited representation and communication with the CMCC. Israel has not permitted NCAG representatives to enter Israel or the CMCC. The NCAG is additionally constrained by the BoP which approves the materials released to the public. NCAG communications to the population in Gaza, and to international audiences, are currently both limited, leading to a prolonged state of policial limbo for the NCAG.

This reality is further compounded by the current Israeli government's inclination to favour the possibility of renewed military operations. At the same time, major European powers and broader international actors have demonstrated growing interest in bringing the humanitarian and political crisis in Gaza to an end.

Humanitarian Aid Facilitators – The IDF has allowed only international NGOs to register to deliver humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip, while Israeli and Palestinian aid organizations are required to operate through a third party to provide aid in Gaza.

In March 2025, the IDF added new registration requirements for INGOs making it more difficult for organizations to register.²⁹ These additional requirements included a disproportionate amount of personal information about the Palestinian INGO staff working on the ground in Gaza, like information about employee's spouses, and names and passport numbers of their children.³⁰ Moreover, the list of organizations which UN 2702 has recognized as operational in Gaza (App. E), is not the same as the list which the IDF has publicly recognized (App. D). UN 2702, operated by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), is the mechanism tasked with facilitating the flow of aid to Gaza, as well as tracking

²⁸ Jacob Magid, "UAE Sends Board of Peace \$100 Million for Training of New Gaza Police Force, Officials Say," The Times of Israel, accessed May 26, 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/uae-sends-board-of-peace-100-million-for-training-of-new-gaza-police-force-officials/>

²⁹ Israel Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, "International Non-Governmental Organizations Primarily Engaged in Activities with Palestinian Residents for the Purpose of Humanitarian Aid," Government of Israel, last modified September 14, 2025, accessed May 27, 2026, gov.il page

³⁰ Ibid.

it, and coordinating with COGAT on these matters. INGOs are required to register through the Israeli Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism to be allowed to deliver humanitarian aid in Gaza is through the.³¹

Two types of trucks enter the Gaza Strip: those carrying commercial goods and those delivering humanitarian aid. In the original October 2025 ceasefire agreement, a benchmark of 600 trucks a day (based on pre-war numbers) was considered the minimum number of trucks to supply Palestinians in Gaza with humanitarian aid; food and medical supplies. Since the ceasefire, however, Israel has interpreted the 600-truck minimum more broadly to include trucks delivering humanitarian aid, and trucks carrying commercial goods. Beside a lack of transparency as to which private sector actors are allowed to deliver commercial goods into Gaza, private sector actors are not concerned with delivering needed food and medical supplies to vulnerable communities. They are primarily interested in providing high-value commodities for the private markets, such as candy and soft drinks which does not necessarily serve the nutritional needs of displaced persons communities.³²

Infrastructure and materials to provide Gazans with access to clean water, wastewater management, permanent housing, energy sources, roads, and agriculture are particularly difficult to deliver into Gaza due to IDF dual use restrictions. 11 clusters headed by different UN agencies work to deliver aid into Gaza. The six main categories are food, health, WASH, shelter, nutrition, protection, and ops/logistics/telecoms. Humanitarian aid is classified by Israel differently dependent on the likelihood that their use could threaten Israeli security.³³ Many Gazans have been displaced and are currently not living outside of former urban centres, so even if infrastructure such as sewage grids could be reestablished, it would not serve the population in their current location.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Conveyed to authors by CMCC USAF Officer working with the Humanitarian Aid Working Group, April 2026.

³³ Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), Updated Approval Mechanism for Dual-Use Items During the Hostage Release Agreement (Israel Ministry of Defense, January 2025), PDF.

Dilemma (stalemate)

There has been a delay in progress on the recovery of the Gaza Strip since the first part of the ceasefire agreement regarding the exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners and respective remains. This is due to a few compounding reasons. First, there is no clear order for implementation of points 6 through 20 of the 20-Point Peace Plan, leading to difficulties enforcing a clear path forward. Further, no clear plan has been outlined for the demilitarization and disarmament of Hamas, who has regained their stronghold as the governing force over the people of Gaza within the red zone. It should be noted that sources within Hamas claim that they cannot agree to give up their weapons without an agreement that all para-military groups in Gaza give up their weapons, otherwise the general Gazan population and the formerly armed Hamas members will be at the mercy of these para-military forces. In addition, Hamas demands that Israel withdraw its military forces before Hamas disarms.

The rate of humanitarian aid entering Gaza has been well below the agreed upon quantities.³⁴ Progress has also been impacted by the recent Iran War which has taken both manpower and global attention away from Gaza. Moreover, the stalled progress has made countries who have pledged humanitarian aid and recovery funding hesitant to deliver on their pledges.³⁵

Israel, the CMCC, and Hamas hold competing narratives as to why the stalemate on progress on Gaza recovery has yet to be resolved.

Israel is firm on maintaining the relative status quo as long as Hamas refuses to demilitarize. Israel remains deeply traumatized from the attacks on October 7, 2023, and as a result the Israeli government has taken an approach with what they perceive to be the lowest level of risk to their national security. Within this framework, reconstruction and governance normalization are

³⁴ Reuters. “UN Warns Gaza Aid Shortfall Is Deepening Hunger and Displacement.” Video. May 18, 2026. Reuters Connect

³⁵ Cate Brown, Emma Graham-Harrison, and Julian Borger, “‘The Door to the Future of Gaza Is Still Closed’: Trump’s Reconstruction Promises Stall,” The Guardian, May 20, 2026

treated as contingent on irreversible security assurances rather than parallel processes.

The CMCC's job is to coordinate the Trump 20-Point Peace Plan. It is their job to work collaboratively with the ISF and other international actors to configure a disarmament plan and to coordinate with international partners on the stabilization and recovery of Gaza. The ISF, however, is unable to deploy within the Gaza Strip and begin to stabilize the situation, until Hamas demilitarizes.

Hamas is willing to give up governing control of Gaza, as handling the humanitarian crisis is difficult and beyond their capacity. However, disarming is not something they are willing to do for several reasons. As Israel continues to occupy roughly 60% of Gaza and has not stopped military operations in the Gaza Strip, Hamas is unwilling to take the first step to demilitarizing the Gaza Strip.³⁶ Further, Hamas has argued that if they demilitarize there will be a power vacuum that will be filled either by another armed militia functioning in Gaza such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or different armed clans which have positioned themselves as strongly anti-Hamas.

It is critical that NCAG is able to gain control of the Gaza Strip, with the aid of the ISF, immediately upon their arrival into Gaza. The exact plan for how the ISF and NCAG will enter Gaza has yet to be confirmed. However, whatever the entry strategy is, executing it will be extremely challenging.

³⁶ Sam Halpern and Amichai Stein, "Hamas Refuses to Give Up Weapons, Demands Board of Peace Change Gaza Ceasefire Plan," Jerusalem Post, April 15, 2026, <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-893098>

Policy proposals

Overview

The following policy proposals seek to help answer the central questions of this paper, established above:

- How can the NCAG operate in ways that allow it to remain politically relevant during the interim period imposed by the ongoing deadlock between Israel and Hamas?
- How can the NCAG position itself as a credible and influential political actor, both regionally and internationally, even though it is perceived as an externally driven American initiative?

This paper takes a three-pronged approach to looking at how the NCAG can be strengthened in both its function, and how it is viewed by others as a relevant political actor. These three focuses are: ensuring that the NCAG has established responsibilities, the proactive development of governing and state infrastructure to support the physical entry of NCAG into the Gaza Strip, and the implementation of an effective political communications strategy.

Establishing Responsibilities for the NCAG

Currently, the NCAG holds responsibilities in name only, without the practical capacity to exercise effective governance. This is due both to ongoing obstacles that have prevented the full demilitarization of Hamas and, by extension, Gaza, and to the fact that international governing bodies and partner states have yet to formally assign operational responsibilities to the NCAG.

The NCAG has indicated that it is prepared to engage physically in Gaza only once the ISF has been deployed, ideally within an agreed-upon governance framework. This would include secured multi-year funding commitments, as well as formal authority over key infrastructure, such as the Rafah crossing, that would provide the NCAG with direct and visible administrative responsibilities. The NCAG has made clear that it is willing to assume governance

over Gaza; however, it requires that meaningful responsibilities be conferred in advance to ensure its role is substantive rather than purely symbolic.

Even prior to the fulfilment of these conditions, it is essential that international NGOs and state actors begin engaging directly with the NCAG to recognize it as a legitimate and relevant political actor in relation to Gaza. The NCAG's effectiveness depends in part on external institutions communicating with it, and assigning it functional responsibilities that reinforce its visibility and administrative credibility within the territory. This engagement could take several forms. Within the humanitarian sphere, for example, the NCAG could begin facilitating aid distribution accompanied by public communication materials, ensuring that the population is aware of the emerging governing structure working on its behalf. Additional early areas of responsibility could include lighter aspects of humanitarian aid coordination in some capacity, even if this role is symbolic, or having the ability to publish their plans for the future of Gaza in a more developed and public way.

Some of the responsibilities of the NCAG should be implemented even prior to full demilitarization, to ensure that the NCAG is not perceived as an entirely external actor upon its physical entry into Gaza, but rather as an emerging governing authority.

Proactive Infrastructure Development

For the NCAG's entry into Gaza to be successful, steps to integrate governing infrastructure prior to their entry need to be taken strategically. Once the process to enter Gaza is undertaken by the ISF, it needs to be swiftly followed by the construction of both governing, and justice infrastructure.

Infrastructure development includes both physical workspaces, like offices, courts, dispute resolution mechanisms and jails, as well as legislative infrastructure and a judicial system so that order can be upheld. Establishing the necessary infrastructure prior to the entry of NCAG officials into Gaza will increase their power, and decrease potential competition for control with Hamas or other armed factions.

In environments where formal courts and justice systems are absent or delayed, the law enforcement role of the state is usually the first to be replaced by alternatives such as tribal mechanisms, factional tribunals, or armed enforcement structures. The current state of Gaza is particularly vulnerable to this.

Communications strategy

The NCAG needs effectively three different communications strategies to ensure that Israel, the international community, and Gazans are aware of its role and the actions it is taking to practically improve the living conditions in Gaza and assume legitimate control of the Strip. The importance of a communications strategy has already been discussed by the NCAG in their inaugural meeting, however, there has been limited development since the meeting in February 2026.

Currently, the NCAG only releases official materials in English and Arabic on its website, and its social media content is released exclusively in Arabic. To increase reach to Israeli and international audiences, material should also be produced in Hebrew, French, Spanish, and other languages. For their reach to be fully maximized, a consistent strategy should be implemented in all four languages with regular updates on their work, and more information about the specific roles of each individual committee member.

Outreach to Israeli audiences in Hebrew is particularly important to show that the NCAG is willing to work in cooperation with the Israeli government as an active partner in demilitarizing and re-establishing a functioning, liveable, and demilitarized Gaza Strip. Following October 7th, 2023, and years of distrust for the Palestinian Authority spread by the Israeli political echelon, the Israeli public remains deeply distrustful of any form of Palestinian authority. THE NCAG's role is not well known to the Israeli public, despite its importance for the safety and security of Israelis and Palestinians alike. The implementation of **Gaza Phase II** is generally unpopular with Israelis, with just over 50% feeling as though moving towards

Gaza Phase II is not aligned with Israeli interests.³⁷ The relevance of Gaza's recovery for Israel's security interest must therefore be communicated to the Israeli public. This messaging should come from the NCAG, the CMCC, and directly from the White House, as despite recent disagreements over the Iran negotiations, President Trump is still seen as looking out for Israel's security interests.

In addition to materials targeting Israeli and international audiences, the NCAG also needs to ensure that Gazans are aware of their role and capacities. To be seen as a legitimate government by the people they are set to govern, a targeted outreach to the Gazans public is required. As internet access is unstable and unpredictable in Gaza, physical communications materials should be distributed by the NCAG about the steps they are taking to work with the ISF, provide aid, and establish a functioning government. It is important that Gazans are not only told there is a government working to represent their interests but see with their own eyes that NCAG can deliver. This is why communication must be combined with action.

Breaking the stalemate

What was known as the “Clear, Hold, and Build strategy”, now known as the “Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition doctrine” has been employed with different degrees of success in counterinsurgency campaigns around the world since the end of World War II, including in the Malayan Peninsula, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. According to General David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, the Clear, Hold, and Build strategy was used in limited areas of fighting during the Vietnam war, and succeeded in defeating Viet Cong insurgents in those areas, but was not widely enough adopted by the US Army or the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) to have made an impact on the outcome of the war. The strategy was used successfully by General Petraeus himself, while he commanded the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) from 2007 to 2008. The “Iraq Surge” (the temporary deployment of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops and shift to a counterinsurgency doctrine designed to secure the population)

³⁷ Mora Deitch, Idit Shafran Gittleman, Abir Gitlin, and Gal Shani, “INSS Survey: February 2026,” Institute for National Security Studies, accessed May 26, 2026, <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/inss-survey-february-2026/>



together with outreach to local leaders successfully turned around the internecine violence in Iraq which had reached a peak before Petraeus was put in command of the multinational force and brought Iraq back from the brink of chaos.³⁸

Lessons learned from this mission and others have been incorporated into the joint US Army and Marine Corps manual: *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies Manual* (US Army 2014). The manual breaks down the Shape–Clear–Hold–Build–Transition framework into its 5 components. The manual emphasizes that this is not a rigid sequence, but a set of overlapping activities designed to progressively increase host-nation capacity while reducing insurgent influence.³⁹

The five key strategic phases

Phase	Primary Objective	Key Activities
1. Shape	Prepare the environment	Understand the population and insurgency, gather intelligence, identify root causes, isolate insurgents, conduct information operations, and coordinate civilian and military partners.
2. Clear	Remove insurgent control	Eliminate organized insurgent forces, secure the population, restore basic governmental functions, enforce rule of law, and prevent insurgents from re-establishing control. Offensive operations dominate, but stability activities begin immediately.

³⁸ Petraeus, D., & Roberts, A. (2023). *Conflict: The evolution of warfare from 1945 to Ukraine*. Harper.

³⁹ United States Army. (2014). *Insurgencies and countering insurgencies* (Field Manual No. 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-02). Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. <https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCWP%203-33.5%20Insurgencies%20and%20Countering%20Insurgencies.pdf>

Phase	Primary Objective	Key Activities
3. Hold	Maintain security	Prevent insurgent return while building capable host-nation security forces. The doctrine stresses that areas should not be cleared unless they can be held . Defensive operations become the priority, alongside training police and military and establishing governance.
4. Build	Address the causes of the insurgency	Strengthen legitimate governance, rule of law, economic development, and public services while addressing the underlying grievances that fuel insurgency. Host-nation institutions increasingly lead.
5. Transition	Transfer responsibility	Shift security and governance responsibilities fully to host-nation authorities while external forces move into a supporting role. The end state is a host nation capable of sustaining security and governance independently.

The most critical overarching strategic principles of the **Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition** doctrine are:

- 1. Focus on protecting the population instead of simply destroying the insurgents.** Security of civilians is central to gaining legitimacy for any action.
- 2. Build host-nation legitimacy.** Counterinsurgency is basically a contest for legitimacy and influence over the population, not control of territory.
- 3. Address root causes of the conflict.** Military action alone cannot defeat an insurgency; governance, justice, economic opportunity, and political inclusion must remove the conditions that sustain the insurgents.
- 4. Use unified civilian–military action.** Diplomatic, economic, informational, non-governmental, law enforcement, and military efforts must be synchronized.
- 5. Enable the host nation.** The ultimate objective is not indefinite external control but developing host-nation institutions capable of maintaining security and legitimacy on their own.



Undoubtably, the US government had the **Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition** framework in mind when establishing the CMCC to implement the 20-Point Peace Plan launched in the fall of 2025. Section 9-38 of the manual states “To better facilitate the integration of all components of the unified action environment into the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, counterinsurgents may establish an area coordination center. An area coordination center controls, manages, and coordinates shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework operations. An area coordination center’s membership includes representatives of all multinational forces and host-nation agencies (military, police, intelligence, political, and civil administration) operating at the regional and local level.” In the case of the CMCC, this also includes international and local NGOs for the purpose of information sharing and where possible, coordination.

Whether this framework is relevant to the situation in Gaza is a legitimate question. The doctrine focuses on 3 major actors, insurgents, counterinsurgents, and the host-nation. The goal of a counterinsurgency operation is for the counterinsurgents to weaken the influence of the insurgency and strengthen the influence of the host-nation institutions over the population.

The Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies Manual, describes an insurgency as an armed struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. This assumes that there is a state government in place which is being undermined by an armed non-state actor. In the case of Gaza, Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, in what was seen at the time as fair elections. Hamas initially formed a government on its own and then agreed to form a government with its chief rival Fatah, but this agreement fell apart in 2007 resulting in the political split between Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas violently seized control of Gaza while Fatah maintained its power in the West Bank. Despite the elections, Hamas did not gain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community due to its refusal to recognize the agreements signed between Israel and the PLO, its refusal to recognize the State of Israel, and its ongoing violent acts of terrorism against Israel and its own people. Support for Hamas inside of Gaza has fluctuated and decreased over the years. Initially,

the election results of 2006 indicated support for Hamas, but due to the authoritarian nature of the regime, and the dire economic circumstances in Gaza, dissatisfaction with Hamas has risen except for a brief period of unity following October 7th, 2023.⁴⁰⁻⁴¹

While the Hamas Israel conflict does not fit the classical definition of an insurgency as informal warfare aimed at overthrowing a government, there are many characteristics of this conflict which bear resemblance to an insurgency such as the embedding of irregular armed forces inside a population, the use of guerilla tactics, and the asymmetry of military forces. Section 1-3 of the 2014 US Army Manual states, “Insurgency in the most basic form is a struggle for control and influence, generally from a position of relative weakness, outside existing state institutions. ... An insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.” If we view the conflict as an attempt to initially control all the Palestinian Territories (Gaza and the West Bank), and then to destroy the State of Israel, Hamas’s military activity can be seen as an insurgency with Israel, the US and the International Stabilization Force as the counterinsurgency force and the Palestinian Authority and the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza as representing the host-nation.

It seems clear that the Israeli military did not recognize the insurgent nature of the Hamas Israel conflict. Had they attempted to implement a Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition counterinsurgency strategy, we would not have ended where we are today, with almost the entire Gazan population displaced, stewing in shelters flooded by untreated sewage, infested by disease carrying insects and rats, living in tattered tents, lacking electricity, sufficient food and water, and wanting in educational, community, and health services. The result of two years of war between Hamas and Israel following the barbaric attacks on and massacre of Israeli civilians on the Gaza border by Hamas, affiliated groups, and some Palestinian civilians, has been the death of tens of thousands of Palestinian non-combatants, including women

⁴⁰ <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/all-changed-hamas-still-hamas>

⁴¹ <https://realignforpalestine.org/articles/how-hamas-has-maintained-its-grip-on-gaza-since-2007>

and children, the destruction of over 80% of buildings in Gaza, the destruction of all major water, sanitation, and energy infrastructure, the Israeli occupation of 60% of the Gaza Strip, with almost the entire population of Gaza forced into the 40% enclave of Gaza controlled by Hamas. Instead of separating Hamas and its influence from the Palestinian civilian population, the IDF has ensured that Hamas remains completely embedded in the civilian population, in complete control, and able to utilize civilians as human shields, a source of finance, and a source for recruitment of new militants.

The most critical overarching strategic principle of the Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition doctrine, stressed throughout the US Army Manual is to focus on protecting the civilian population instead of focusing on destroying the insurgents. Security of civilians is central to gaining legitimacy for any further actions. Israel abandoned this principle in the very beginning of the war when it abandoned its long-standing policy of dropping small explosives on roofs of targeted buildings to warn civilians to get out before the buildings which housed both terrorists and civilians were demolished in air raids.⁴²

The abandonment of this policy has led to the deaths of thousands of Palestinian civilians and set the stage for the lack of compassion and empathy for a people used as human shields by Hamas and regarded as necessary collateral damage by Israel. Over the past 3 years, Israel had the opportunity to separate Palestinian civilians from the authoritarian grip of the Hamas terrorists but instead, its lack of concern for the safety and security of civilians in Gaza resulted in international condemnation, and possibly pushing civilians back into the iron grip of Hamas.

However, changing strategic priorities after years of conflict is possible and beneficial, as seen in Iraq from 2007 to 2008, 3 years after the beginning of that war, which resulted in reduced violence and stabilization for the region. A shift in the focus of Israel's counterinsurgency strategy from hunting Hamas to protecting

⁴² https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/the-practice-of-roof-knocking-from-the-perspective-of-international-law/

civilians, would be met with understandable skepticism from the Palestinian population in Gaza and international community in general. This change in approach would take time to have an effect and require complete coordination between all counterinsurgency forces, both military and civilian, including the Israeli Defense Force, the Israeli political leadership, the United States, Egypt, other Arab countries, the ISF, the UN agencies, international NGOs and local Israeli and Palestinian NGOs.

The current stalemate in the implementation of **Phase II** of the 20-Point Peace Plan is a result of the lack of timeline or sequence of steps to be implemented. Hamas is meant to disarm, and Israel is meant to withdraw, the ISF is meant to enter Gaza and provide security for both Palestinians and Israelis (stopping Hamas from crossing the border), and NCAG is meant to assume responsibility for civilian governance, but none of these steps are being implemented because it is unclear how the process should begin. There is also still doubt as to Israel's intention to withdraw from Gaza and Hamas's intention to give up its arms.

What is needed is a testing ground for a different reality, one in which civilians are safe, not threatened by the IDF or by Hamas, one in which security is guaranteed by the ISF, and governance is provided by NCAG. Often referred to as the Ink-blot Strategy or the Ink-spot Strategy, used in various counterinsurgencies such as those mentioned previously, it is a military manoeuvre whereby counterinsurgency and reconstruction spread outwards from secured key areas, as an ink-spot expands on paper.⁴³

Over the past two and a half years since the early spring of 2024, through the joint Israeli Palestinian environmental-humanitarian initiative Jumpstarting Hope in Gaza, the Palestinian NGO Damour for Community Development, and the Israeli Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, have created islands of refuge for displaced persons, without interference from outside armed groups, offering shelter, a level of safety, food and water security, and other community services. These self-managed communities in

⁴³ <https://archive.nytimes.com/schott.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/ink-spot-strategy/>

addition to similar shelters established by other organizations have the potential be the ink-spot in an expanding area of influence of counterinsurgent forces.

To create such islands of safety for civilians where Palestinians are concentrated, currently in the red zone controlled by Hamas, a first step could be a Hamas withdrawal and ceding control of a small area to the ISF and NCAG. This appears to be a similar strategy to that being employed through the recent Israel Lebanon agreement. Israel could incentivize Hamas to agree to such an arrangement if Israel in turn agreed to withdraw and cede control of a small area it occupies in the green zone.

Building trust and legitimacy is critical to moving the Gaza Strip, and the region as whole, away from the repeated cycles of violence it has suffered for decades to a stable and sustainable Middle East. The legitimacy of the 20-Point Peace Plan lies in the ISF and NCAG's ability to deliver security and governance to Palestinians in Gaza. In addition to the recommendations made in the previous section, the following are recommendations to break the stalemate in phase II of the Trump Peace Plan and launch Gaza on the long road to recovery:

1. **Shape** – Israel must prioritize the safety and security of the civilian population by committing to eliminating collateral damage from airstrikes, and guaranteeing the adequate supply of shelter, food, water, energy, sanitation, health care, and education. Movement of goods and human resources must be allowed, which will enable work in food production, building, community services, high-tech, and other means of employment.
2. **Clear** – Negotiators should focus efforts on separating Hamas from the civilian population, not disarmament, at this stage. Disarmament of irregular military forces inside of Gaza must be completed, but creating islands of safety and security is a first step. An agreement, supervised by the US and the ISF, between Israel and Hamas, to withdraw forces simultaneously to allow displaced persons shelters to be appropriately supplied and secured.

3. **Hold** – Empower ISF and NCAG to assume security and governance roles inside the displaced persons shelters in the islands of safety and security created by Hamas and Israeli withdrawal. Continue to expand the influence of these two counterinsurgency forces to extend over the entire Gaza strip as Israel withdraws and Hamas reduces its footprint, disarms and integrates into the political process.
4. **Build and Transition** – These two phases of the **Shape-Clear-Hold-Build- Transition** strategy will begin once the first three phases have made significant progress. Various ideas have been put forward about what a revived and rebuilt Gaza could look like, and the critical role it could play as part of a unified and independent Palestinian State. Visions of a prosperous and peaceful future exist, what is lacking is a practical approach to ending the stalemate presenting first steps towards that future of truly ending the conflict and beginning recovery for Gaza, the Palestinian people and the Middle East.

“A journey of a thousand miles starts beneath one’s feet” – Lao Tzu



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Appendices

Appendix A:

Executive Board for the Board of Peace

Name of Member	Position
Ajay Banga	President of the World Bank
Sir Tony Blair	Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
Martin Edelman	General Counsel of G42
Robert Gabriel Jr.	United States Deputy National Security Advisor
Jared Kushner	CEO of Affinity Partners
Marc Rowan	Co-Founder, CEO and Chair of the board of Apollo Global Management, Inc.
Marco Rubio	United States Secretary of State, Acting United States National Security Advisor
Steve Witkoff	United States Special Envoy for Peace Missions
Susie Wiles	Chief of Staff to President Donald Trump



Members of the Gaza Executive Board

Name	Position
H.E. Nickolay Mladenov	High Representative for Gaza and Director General of Board of Peace
Minister Reem Al-Hashimy	UAE Minister of State for International Cooperation
Minister Adel Al-Jubair	Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Ali Al-Thawadi	Qatari Diplomat
Sir Tony Blair	Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
Michael Eisenberg	Venture Capitalist
Minister Hakan Fidan	Foreign Minister of Turkey
Yakir Gabay	Israeli-Cypriot Businessman
Sigrid Kaag	UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
Jared Kushner	CEO of Affinity Partners
General Hassan Rashad	Director, Egyptian General Intelligence Service
Marc Rowan	Co-Founder, CEO and Chair of the board of Apollo Global Management, Inc.
Steve Witkoff	United States Special Envoy for Peace Missions
Susie Wiles	Chief of Staff to President Donald Trump

Appendix C:

Members of the NCAG

Name	Role
Dr. Ali Shaath	Chief Commissioner; Acting Energy & Transport Commissioner
Abdel Karim Ahmed Ashour	Commissioner for Communications and Digital Services
Hanaa Hanna Nicola Tarazi	Commissioner for Social Protection
Ayed Awni Abu-Ramadan	Commissioner for Economy, Industry, and Trade
Dr. Jabr Ibrahim El-Daour	Commissioner for Education
Dr. Bashir Rayyes	Commissioner for Finance
Dr. Aed Mahmoud Yaghi	Commissioner for Health
Sami Nasman	Commissioner for Interior and Internal Security
Adnan Salem Abuwarda	Commissioner for Justice
Osama Al-Sa'dawi	Commissioner for Land and Housing
Dr. Ali Shehda Barhoum	Commissioner for Municipal Affairs and Water

Appendix D:

Organizations Registered with both the IDF and UN2720

Organization	Headquarters
Samaritan's Purse International Relief	United States of America
Community of Reconciliation – GDV	Switzerland
International Medical Corps	United States of America
The HALO Trust	United Kingdom
Global Empowerment Mission, Inc.	United States of America
Multifaith Alliance, Inc.	United States of America
Catholic Relief Services	United States of America
Solidarités International	France
The Sumner Foundation	United Kingdom
AMIDEAST (America Mideast Educational & Training Services Inc)	United States of America
All Hands and Hearts	United States of America
Project HOPE	United States of America
UK-Med	United Kingdom
International NGO Safety Organization (INSO)	The Netherlands
United Bible Societies	United Kingdom
World Central Kitchen	United States of America



Organization	Headquarters
International Civil Defence Organization	Switzerland
Gaza Children's Village	United States of America
Emergenza Sorrisi – Doctors for Smiling Children ETS	Italy
International Orthodox Christian Charities	United States of America
People in Need (PIN)	Czech Republic
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e. V	Germany
Seeds of Hope	United States of America
ACTED	France
Peace Winds Japan	Japan
Christian Aid Ministries	United States of America
International Committee of the Red Cross	Switzerland
AVSI	Italy
Heal Palestine	United States of America
MENTOR Initiative	United States of America
Blumont Global Development	United States of America
Lifegate Rehabilitation	Germany
World Class Scholars	United States of America and United Arab Emirates



Appendix E:

Organizations listed only with UN2720

Organization	Headquarters
Global Aid Network	United Kingdom
Cyprus Civil Defence	Cyprus
Time of Freedom	Poland
Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization	Jordan
Médecins Sans Frontières	Switzerland
American Near East Refugee Aid	United States of America
Confederazione Nazionale delle Misericordie d'Italia	Italy



UN Branches Participating in Humanitarian Relief in Gaza:

- World Food Programme
- United Nations Children's Fund
- International Organization for Migration
- United Nations Development Programme
- World Health Organization
- United Nations Population Fund
- Food and Agriculture Organization
- United Nations Department of Safety and Security

***Humanitarian organizations listed with UN2702 may differ from those listed by the IDF due to website update delays.**

***The UN2720 Mechanism enables humanitarian partners to register on an integrated application portal and database (UN2720 Mechanism System) where all planned aid consignments intended for Gaza are tracked. [Link](#)**

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